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Abstract 
 
In 1997, the Ohio senate passed Senate Bill 102 which established the Ohio School Facilities Commission as a 
separate agency to oversee the rebuilding projects of the public schools in Ohio.  To lower the construction cost, 
the bill exempted construction contractors from paying prevailing wages on these projects based on the 
hypothesis that this exemption would save the Ohio tax payer 10.7%.  Many other studies concluded that these 
savings would range from 1.5 to 26%.  The purpose of this research was to investigate this hypothesis through the 
statistical analysis of 8093 bids received for the schools’ construction from the years 2000 through 2007.  Union 
contractors- who paid their workers union wages-and non-union contractors- who did not pay prevailing wages- 
bid these projects.  By comparing the bids/SF from both groups (union and nonunion), the hypothesis was tested.  
The research indicated that there was no significant difference between the bids for union contractors and the 
bids for non-union contractors. 
 
Introduction  
 
The Davis-Bacon Act of 1931 and its related acts require that all contractors and subcontractors performing on 
federal contracts or federally assisted contracts in excess of $2,000 pay their laborers not less than the prevailing 
wage rates and fringe benefits, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, for corresponding classes of laborers and 
mechanics employed on similar projects in the area(U.S. Department of Labor, 2008).Generally,the Ohio labor 
laws mandate that the laborers working on projects funded by the State of Ohio have to be paid prevailing wages 
and benefits.  However, in 1997,Ohio Senate Bill 102 of the 122nd General Assembly created the Ohio School 
Facilities Commission (OSFC) as a separate and distinct agency to oversee the rebuilding of public schools in 
Ohioand exempted construction undertaken by school districts from Ohio's prevailing wage laws (PWL) to lower 
the cost of construction to the tax payer.  This exemption does not conflict with the federal PWL because this 
project was fully funded through the state of Ohio (Burley, 2002). 
 
Considerable literature and news articles debated the merit of PWL; some estimated cost increase of more than 
30% and others stated that there would be no cost increases.  While these studies agree that Davis-Bacon raises 
wage rates and, by implication, costs to the government, there is wide variation in the estimates. Kessler & Katz, 
(2001) estimated that the Davis-Bacon Act increased the cost of construction to the federal government from 1.4 
to 24%.  There are many factors that affect the cost of a construction project which make it difficult to isolate the 
impact of PWL from other factors. 
 
The rebuilding of the public schools project in Ohio provided an excellent (but not perfect) opportunity to study 
the impact of PWL on prices for the owner.  In this study, the authors compared the cost / square foot (SF) from 
8093 bids from the years 2000 through 2007.  Some of the contractors were union contractors who paid union 
wages; and some were non-union contractors who were exempt from paying prevailing wages after the passage of 
Ohio Senate Bill 102.  These public schools were equitable and built to the same design guidelines and quality 
(personal communication with Eric Bode, OSFC).  This paper adds to the studies that analyze the impact of PWL 
on the cost of construction by presenting a summary of literature against and for PWL followed by the analysis of 
8093 bids to build these Ohio public schools. 
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Arguments against PWL 
 
PWL increase labor costs, and consequently, the project construction costs.  The Ohio Legislative Service 
Commission State House (OLSC) in its report titled“The Effects of the Exemption of School Construction 
Projects from Ohio’s PWL”estimatedthe exemption saved the Ohio tax payer $487.9 million in aggregate during 
the post-exemption period, an overall savings of 10.7%. Estimated savings on new construction projects were 
$24.6 million (1.2%), estimated savings on school building additions to be $408.0 million (19.9%),and estimated 
savings on school building alterations were $55.2 million (2.7%). Estimated savings in urban counties totaled 
$310.5 million (15.13%) while estimated savings in rural counties totaled $177.4 million (8.65%).The report 
stated that these savings were at least partially attributable to the prevailing wage exemption, but their research 
team could not confidently confirm that this was the case(Burley, 2002).The OLSC report,citingFraundorf, 
Farrell, & Mason(1984)in their study of the effect of the Davis-Bacon Act on construction costs in rural areas, 
concluded that "a project subject to the Act would cost on average 26.1% more than the same project not subject 
to the Act."  Fraundorf, et al, stated that the reason for the increase isbased on how workers are utilized.   
 
The OLSC report further elaborated that analyses done in conjunction with the repeal or attempted repeal of the 
PWL in Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, andNew Hampshire expected construction 
savings of 9.4%.  The report cited the following reasons for the cost increase under PWL: (1) PWL reduce 
competition - non-union contractors may choose to not bid on a project that is subject to prevailing wage 
requirements, reducing competition for union contractors, (2) PWL discriminate against minority and small 
contractors, (3) PWL hurt rural contractors and workers, (4) PWL do not guarantee quality, and (5) PWL do not 
increase local tax bases. 
 
While empirical evidence related to productivity differentials was mixed, the contention that unions, on average, 
significantly raise productivity could not be sustained (Addison & Hirsch, 1989).  Freeman and Medoff(1983) 
argued that unions reduced profitability in general because their productivity effects, though substantive, were 
nevertheless insufficient to offset increases in wage costs and greater capital intensity(Freeman & Medoff, 1983). 
 
Returns accruing from other correlates of market power (e.g., market share, foreign competition, and government 
entry restrictions) and from long-lived capital appear to be more important sources of union rents. Union rent 
seeking at the expense of long-lived tangible and intangible capital appears to lower firms' investment in physical 
capital, as well as to decrease R&D and other innovative and risk-taking activities. As a consequence, 
productivity growth tends to be slower in unionized firms and industries (Addison & Hirsch, 1989). 
 
The savings estimates found in other literature are presented in Table 1. Although the studies indicate savings 
from the removal of prevailing wage requirements, none of these estimated savings meet the standards of 
statistical significance. A statistically significant result is unlikely to have occurred due to chance(Statistical 
Assessment Service at George Mason University, 2012).The estimated savings are considerably lower than the 20 
to 25% savings that some opponents of PWL have claimed.  
 
Table 1 Estimated Savings (Burley, 2002) 
 
Author(s) Savings 
(Thieblot, 1975) 0.6% 
(Gould and Bittlingmayer, 1980) 4 to 7% 
(Prus, 1996) 5.1% 
(Prus, 1999) 3.8% 
(Phillips, 1999) 2.4% 
(Phillips, 2001) 0.7% 
 
Arguments for PWL 
 
The studies that refute the argument that PWL increase project costs are based on the premise that higher wages 
encourage the use of more productive workers that partially offset the direct effect of higher wages on cost.  The 
National Heavy and Highway Alliance reviewed and analyzed records for highways built from 1994 through 
2002.  
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The findings confirmed that when workers skills and productivity justified higher wage rates, highways were built 
at the same, or even lower, cost per mile than when lower wage, lower skilled workers were employedas shown in 
Table 2 (Construction Labor Research Council, 2004). 
 
Table 2: Wages and the cost per mile (Construction Labor Research Council, 2004) 
 
 Low Wage High Wage 
Average Hourly Wage $15.68 $26.34 
Hours Per Mile 10, 276 6,991 
Labor Costs Per Mile $161,128 $184,138 
Total Costs Per Mile $857,965 $826,509 
Difference $31,456 
 
Philips (2001) compared the cost/SF of 201 public schools without PWL to the cost/SF of 190 public schools with 
PWL built in Kentucky, Ohio and Michigan from 1991 to 2000.  The study concluded that there was no 
statistically significant difference between those two groupsafter adjusting for inflation.However, a review of 
costs one year after Ohio exempted school construction from prevailing wage requirements showed that the cost 
for new school construction increased from $77/SF before the exemption to $90/SF one year later.  A more 
complex statistical model-that estimated cost/ SF for new public schools-found that school boards could save 10% 
of construction costs by starting in the spring compared to winter(Phillips, 2001). 
 
Gillena, Baltz, Gassel, Kirsch, & Vaccaro(2002) evaluated injured construction workers’ perceptions of 
workplace safety climate, psychological job demands, decision latitude, and coworker support, and the 
relationship of those variables to the injury severity sustained by the workers. There were statistically significant 
differences between union and nonunion workers’ responses regarding perceived safety climate. Union workers 
were more likely than non-union workers to: (a) perceive their supervisors as caring about their safety; (b) be 
made aware of dangerous work practices; (c) have received safety instructions when hired; (d) have regular job 
safety meetings; and (e) perceive that taking risks was not a part of their job. 
 
OLSC (2002) also stated the following benefits for prevailing wage laws: (1) PWL protect both the wages and 
jobs of local workers by preventing "wage dumping" by outside contractors, (2) PWL reduce total construction 
costs by encouraging the use of more qualified and productive workers, (3) PWL assure quality construction and 
reduce delays and overruns, (4) PWL help maintain local tax bases, and (5) PWL provide stability in the 
construction industry. 
 
Background for the Rebuilding of Ohio Public School Project 
 
The OSFC provides funding, management oversight, and technical assistance to local school districts for the 
construction and renovation of the Ohio school facilities in order to provide an appropriate learning environment 
for Ohio’s children.  The agency builds partnerships with school districts, design firms, construction managers, 
and trade contractors to construct quality schools (About OSFC: Mission).  The OSFC works with the local 
school districts through each stage of construction and breaks the process into the following categories: financial 
partnership, facility planning, and project management (About OSFC: What We Do). 
 
The OSFC serves as a funding partner for the school districts to finance their school construction projects. The 
program is designed to provide different levels of state funding assistance to the districts according to their 
financial abilities (the districts’ assessed property valuation per pupil).  In other words, the amount or share of the 
total project cost a district paysis based on the property valuation per pupil.  This share for each district is 
calculated based on the Derolph, v.the state of Ohio(1997)case that preceded the creation of the OSFC. The 
calculation ensures that schools throughout the state are “adequate and equitable,” in other words the schools are 
similar (personal communication with Eric Bode, OSFC).  The OSFC also provides funding assistance in the form 
of loans to the districts that need funding (Ohio School Facilities Commission, 2008). 
 
The goal of OSFC is to ensure statewide equity and quality for school facilities using a comprehensive 
standardized facilities assessment program and the Ohio School Design Manual (OSDM)to standardize the 
process. The OSFC Planning Group is responsible for the assessment and master planning of classroom facilities 
for schools participating in the OSFC program.  
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As districts are permitted to choose their own architects, the OSDM provides districts and architects with 
standards of design and construction that assure a statewide standard of quality (Ohio School Facilities 
Commission, 2008). 
 
The Bidding Process of OSFC 
 
OSFC uses an efficient project delivery model utilizing the private sector by employing private construction 
management firms to oversee projects.  The bidding process for the OSFC projects is similar to that of other 
public projects. The process begins with public advertisement to bidders, which divides the work into trade 
packages and describes each package. The contractors’ bids are publicly opened, read, and tabulated.Following 
the bid-opening meeting, the low bidders are evaluated against predetermined qualifications to determine whether 
they are responsible bidders (Ohio School Facilities Commission, 2008). 
 
The Research Problem 
 
There are many factors that affect the cost of a construction project which make it difficult to isolate the impact of 
PWL from other factors.  As presented earlier, considerable literature and news articles debate the merit of PWL; 
some claim estimated cost increases of more than 26% and others claim that there are no cost increases.  Labor 
unions, from the neoclassical view, use their monopolistic power to raise wages, thereby increasing costs(Byrnes, 
Fare, Grosskopf, & Lovell, 1988).  From this point of view, it appears obvious that projects completed by union 
contractors would bemore expensive than projects completed by non-union contractors.  However, it is suggested 
that unions reduced turnover, increased quality, and improved productivity (Byrnes et al., 1988).  These 
conflictingviews raise the question:can unions pay more and still submit a competitive bid due to higher 
productivity?The objective of this research was to testthe hypothesis that bids-from contractorswho did not pay 
prevailing wages-were significantly less than those from union contractors in the construction of the OSFC 
projects. 
In order for a trade union to survive and bring the above cited PWL's qualities to the construction 
industry, union contractors must be competitive in a capitalistic market. If the compensation differential exceeds 
the productivity differential, then non-union firms will underbid union firms; therefore, union contractors will 
need to adopt corrective actions to survive.  Some examples of these corrective actions include: lower union labor 
wages, provide more and better union training, re-evaluate the bidding strategy, utilize equipment more and 
worker less, etc.  However, if the union workers are more productive than non-union workers, then the union 
workers should be able to obtain higher wages without having a negative impact on cost.  Unions can use this 
research to be more competitive and turn around the decline in union membership that has been occurring since 
1979 (Belman & Voos, 2006). 
 
Data Analysis 
 
The OSFC provided the authors with several standard reports that were combined into one spreadsheet.  The 
collected data for the research included: county name where the school is located, school district, school name, 
contractor’s name, contractor’s address, contractor’s trade, contractor’s union affiliation, contractor’s bid amount, 
architect/engineers’ (A/E) estimate, and the square footage for eachschool.  Upon review of the received data, 
nearly half of the bids did not have a union/non-union affiliation of the contractor.  Extensive efforts were made 
to find out the union/non-union status of every contractor. These efforts included (1) internet search, (2) 
contacting the regional union offices across Ohio, and (3) contacting the contractors directly.  However, it was not 
possible to collect the affiliation for all the contractors because some had disconnected phone lines and/or had 
gone out of business. The research team determined the union/nonunion affiliations of the contractors for 8093 
out of 8325 bids (97.23%).  The total value of the known union/non-union affiliations bids was $12,495,822,258 
of the total $12,667,724,130 or 98.64% of all bids based on dollar amount.  The bids of unknown contractor 
affiliations were deleted from the data set. 
 
Because the schools across the state of Ohio have different sizes, the comparison between union and non-union 
bid amounts was faulty.  However, the bid amount/SF of the school neutralized the variations in school size.  
Therefore, the first step was dividing the bid amount and the A/E’s estimates over the area of the school for every 
bid. 
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The concentration of unions varied across the state of Ohio; for example, there wasa higher concentration of union 
contractors in the northern region of the state than in the rest of Ohio.  Investigating the existence of significant 
differences between the union and non-union bids /SF in the different regions identified the regions that need 
corrective actions.  For the purpose of this research, the state of Ohiowas divided into the following three regions: 
northern, central, and southern regions as shown in Figure 1.  The northern thirdwas made up of 31 counties, the 
central was made up of 28 counties, and the southern was made up of 29 counties. 
 
 
Figure 1.  The three regions of the state of Ohio 
 
The lowest bids-for the same work in every school/project -were the most competitive, and they were based on 
the most economical method of construction and markup.  The research team created another subset of records 
that contained only the lowest bid for every contract.  Eliminating the inefficient and uncompetitive bids from this 
set of data allowed the comparison between the most competitive bids of the union and non-union contractors.  
OSFC mostly employed the contractors with the lowest bids; therefore, this was the cost to the owner excluding 
the change order cost during construction.  The Statistical Consulting Center (SCC) at Bowling Green State 
University (BGSU) conducted the statistical analysis of the data.   
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The SCC conducted ANOVA analysis using the General Linear Model (GLM) with a 95% confidence level. The 
SCC analyzed two data sets: the first consisted of all bids and the second consisted of the lowest bid for the same 
work. 
 
Results of the Data Analysis 
 
The GLM analysis tested the hypothesis Ho: significant statistical differences in the bids /SF between union and 
non-union contractors existed.  The statistical analysis for all bids from the whole state indicated that the 
hypothesis Ho should be rejected (i.e. there was no significant statistical difference between union and non-union 
bids) for the OSFC projects. Table 3 displays the average and standard deviation (SD); the SD measures the 
statistical dispersion of data around the average.  The determining factor for the presence of significant statistical 
difference was the P-value generated by the GLM analysis.  Using a confidence level of 95%, if the P-valuewas 
greater than the significance level of 0.05, no significant difference exists. If the P-valuewas less than 5%, a 
significant difference between union and non-union bids for OSFC projects exists.  A statistically significant 
result with a 95% confidence levelindicates that there was a 5% probability that it occurred due to chance. If a 
result is not statistically significant, then the measured result is likely to have occurred due to chance.  The five 
percent line is arbitrary, but has become standard in in many fields of research; statistical significance is the 
golden measuring stick for evaluating data(Statistical Assessment Service at George Mason University, 2012).  
Table 3 indicates that the average bid/SF for the non-union contractors ($20.49/SF) was greater than that for the 
union contractors ($19.22/SF). 
 
Table 3 Result of State Level GLM Analysis Using All Bids 
 
Union / Non-Union Number of Bids Average 
$/SF 
SD P-value Accept / Reject 
Ho 
Union 2,307 19.22 25.31 
0.1936 Reject 
Non-union 4,286 20.49 43.03 
 
The analysis of the filtered set of lowest bids indicated that the hypothesis Ho was also rejected and there was no 
significant difference between union and non-union bids.  Table 4 indicates that the average bid/SF for non-union 
contractors is $18.49/SF where the average bid/SF for union contractors are $16.99. 
 
Table 4 Result of State Level GLM Analysis Using the lowest Bids 
 
Union / Non-Union Number of Bids Average 
$/SF 
SD P-value Accept / Reject 
Ho 
Union 547 16.99 23.54 
0.4199 Reject 
Non-union 949 18.49 39.57 
 
The Three Regions Analysis 
 
To identify the locations where significant differences existed between the bids of union contractors and non-
union contractors, the state of Ohio was broken down into three regions as discussed earlier.  Table 5 presents the 
results of the three region GLM analysis using all bids, and Table 6 presents the results using the filtered set of the 
lowest bids.  The tables indicate that there wasno significant difference in the bids /SF between union and non-
union contractors in the North and the Central regions.  However, there was significant difference between the 
bids of union and non-union contractors in the Southern region.  The average of the bids/SF of union contractors 
was significantly less than that of the non-union contractors in both sets of data in the Southern region. 
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Table 5 Results of the Three Region GLM Analysis Using All Bids 
 
Region Union / Non-Union Number of Bids 
Average 
$/SF 
SD P-value 
Accept / Reject 
Ho 
North 
Union 1,804 19.34 24.68 
0.2988 Reject 
Non-union 2,790 18.16 30.37 
Central 
Union 168 13.44 17.59 
0.9714 Reject 
Non-union 447 13.56 18.84 
South 
Union 335 21.49 30.98 
0.0005 Accept 
Non-union 1,049 29.64 69.63 
 
Table 6 Results of the Three Region GLM Analysis Using Minimum Bids 
 
Region Union / Non-Union Number of Bids 
Average 
$/SF 
SD P-value 
Accept / Reject 
Ho 
North 
Union 406 17.38 24.66 0.3908 
Reject 
Non-union 679 15.54 30.99  
Central 
Union 39 15.27 20.04 0.6067 
Reject 
Non-union 89 11.90 17.23  
South 
Union 102 16.08 20.08 <0.0001 
Accept 
Non-union 181 32.78 65.00  
 
Conclusion 
 
The overall analysis for the state of Ohio suggested the rejection of the hypothesis Ho: the average of the bids/SF 
for the union contractors was not significantly different than the average of the bids/SF for the non-union 
contractors.  This conclusion was valid in the case of all the bids and in the case of only the lowest bids. 
 
The three region analysis resulted in the rejection of the hypothesis in the Northern and Central regions while the 
Southern region resulted in the acceptance of the hypothesis.  These results led to the conclusion that there was no 
significant difference between bids of union and non-union contractors in the Northern and Central regions of 
Ohio. However, the analysis of bids in the Southern region indicated a significant difference between the two 
groups with an average union bid of $21.49/SF and an average non-union bid of $29.64. 
 
The definitive reasons for the lack of a statistically significant difference between the bids of the two groups need 
to be further researched.  Production function studies indicated small overall union impacts on productivity; 
positive effects where they existed, appear to result from management response to decreased profit expectations 
and from a natural selection process.  Positive union productivity effects were more evident where competitive 
pressures are present (Addison and Hirsch 1989). A potential reason for the lack of a statistically significant 
difference might be that the wages and benefits for non-union workers were close to those of union workers due 
the boom in the construction market during the years from 2001 to 2007.  The boom created a shortage in the 
skilled workers market, which put a competitive pressure to raise the wages of nonunion workers.  Why were bids 
of contractors in the southern counties so significantly different? Further research into the bid competitiveness of 
the counties in Southern Ohio is an area that deserves further research.   
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